

# Lessons learned from monitoring investment newsletters for over 30 years

June 24, 2013, meeting of the  
Washington, DC chapter of the American  
Association of Individual Investors

# What I said to this chapter 30 years ago, in June 1983

- I asked us to imagine getting back together in 30 years, and putting on an overheard all our individual performances from that day until June 2013
- I predicted that the Vanguard Index 500 fund (VFINX) would be ranked in the 80<sup>th</sup> percentile

# Well...

- Mutual funds
  - According to Lipper, the VFINX has outperformed 76% of all U.S. domestic equity mutual funds (including sector funds and global equity funds) from 6/30/1983 through 5/31/2013
- Investment newsletters
  - According to the Hulbert Financial Digest, the VFINX has outperformed 73% of all investment newsletter portfolios from 6/30/1983 through 5/31/2013
    - *On a Sharpe Ratio, the VFINX outperformed 87% of all newsletter portfolios*
- Survivorship bias
  - The true percentages are higher than 76% and 73%, since these results don't take survivorship bias into account

# Have hedge funds done any better?

- Hedge funds didn't exist in 1983
- Let's look at the last decade (through 5/31/2013)
  - *The Wilshire 5000 Total Return Index has produced an 8.25% annualized return, versus 6.75% for the Dow Jones Credit Suisse Hedge Fund Index.*
- To be sure, the average hedge fund incurred less volatility (or risk) than the overall stock market
  - *But a portfolio divided 60%/40% between the Wilshire 5000 and the Vanguard Total Bond Market Fund would have reduced risk by just as much as the average hedge fund and still made more money*

# Digging deeper into hedge funds


- Some hedge funds did better than this overall average, needless to say...
- But only a small fraction made enough to justify their high fees, according to David Hsieh of Duke University
  - *In one study, Hsieh compared each of several hundred equity hedge funds to a control portfolio—designed to have the same risk profile but only owning index funds and other widely available investments.*
  - *He found that only one out of five did better than its corresponding control portfolio.*

# Why is it so hard to beat the market?

- The average thing we do in the markets is a mistake
- We therefore ought to do as little as possible

# Consider...

## Performance of average stock bought, versus average stock sold



Source: Terrance Odean


# Professor Odean's comment...

- There used to be another human being on the other side of the trade when an individual bought or sold a stock. “Now it’s a supercomputer you’re competing with.”
- Referring to the famous battle between chess’s Grandmasters and IBM’s supercomputer Deep Blue, Prof. Odean added:
  - *“Individuals are no longer playing against Grandmasters; they’re playing against Deep Blue. They will almost certainly lose.”*

# What if advisers didn't trade?

- For all advisers monitored by the Hulbert Financial Digest, froze into place their portfolios at the beginning of a given calendar year. These portfolios made no trades over the subsequent 12 months.
- At the end of that year, looked to see how many of these advisers did better with their actual portfolios than with these hypothetical frozen portfolios...

# 2012 returns of frozen portfolios...



# 2012 was the best year of the last 30 for advisers' trading

- Similar tests were conducted over other years.
- On average, the percentage of frozen portfolios beating the actual portfolios was close to 67%.
- Similar results were reached when other researchers have conducted similar tests for mutual funds

# Is it possible to identify winning advisers in advance?

- Even among those who beat the market in one period, depressingly few proceed to beat the market in the subsequent period
- It's not just that past performance is no guarantee of future performance
  - *In fact, past performance is a depressingly poor guide to future performance*

# Statistical tests

- The Hulbert Financial Digest has exhaustively studied how past performance rankings are correlated with future performance rankings
- The rank correlation coefficient ranges theoretically from  $+1$  (perfectly correlated) to  $-1$  (inverse correlated). A zero coefficient means that the relationship is random

# Results

- The good news is that the coefficients were positive and statistically significant
  - *This means that, other things being equal, you should go with an adviser at the top of the ranking than at the bottom*
- The bad news is that these co-efficients were not very high
  - *R-squareds rarely were higher than 0.1*
  - *This means that 90% of an adviser's ranking in a given period could not be explained by its past ranking*

# Persistence among bottom feeders...

- The strongest correlations appeared at the bottom of the rankings
  - *That means that there is a greater chance that an awful performer will continue his losing ways, than there is that a top performer will be able to continue winning*
- The most important role a performance monitor can play, therefore, may be to help steer you away from the losers
  - *By following my performance rankings, you have a good likelihood of beating the average adviser. Your odds of beating the market nevertheless remain poor*

# Same is true for mutual funds and hedge funds

- Consider hedge funds...
  - *If anyone can identify in advance the select few hedge funds that can truly outperform, then the high-paid consultants and managers of funds of hedge funds ought to be able to do that*
  - *Duke's Prof. Hsieh found that just 2% of funds of hedge funds earn enough to justify paying their fees*